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A B S T R A C T
In international criminal law, as well as in national penal systems, a defendant may be found
guilty of more than one crime as a result of the same act. In that case, the question arises as to
whether this act, while breaching several criminal provisions, in reality violates only one. The
approach followed in case law is so formal as to provide no limiting eﬀects to cumulative
convictions. Plausibly, this is a consequence of a line of thought that emerged in the aftermath of
the Second World War and advances a primarily ‘retributive’ idea of punishment for serious
international crimes, i.e. a kind of idea where there is no room for the perpetrator’s
rehabilitation. In this author’s view, bearing in mind the dramatic development of human
rights’ protection over the years, such an idea should be revised. And this in order to favor a
more substantive approach to the matter of cumulation.
1. Introduction
Under the statutes of all international criminal courts and tribunals in operation, more than one penal provision may punish the
same conduct. If one takes a look at the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, murder is punishable as
genocide, as a crime against humanity and as a war crime. If so, according to the general principles of criminal law, we have either an
ideal concurrence of oﬀences or an apparent concurrence of provisions. An ideal concurrence of oﬀences occurs when a single
criminal act is split into two or more oﬀences. An apparent concurrence of provisions, conversely, occurs when the perpetrator
performs an act that may appear to simultaneously breach several criminal provisions, whilst, in reality, it violates only one. In this
case, it will be necessary to identify the prevailing provision (Palombino, 2005; Stuckenberg, 2015).
To date, international criminal tribunals, following the United States (US) case law (Blockburger v. US, 1932, pp. 214-217), rely
on two principles in order to establish whether multiple convictions are permissible: i) unilateral specialty and ii) reciprocal or
bilateral specialty. An apparent concurrence of provisions, in particular, occurs when the oﬀences in question are in a relationship of
unilateral specialty: ‘if an action is legally regulated both by a general provision and by a speciﬁc one, the latter prevails as the more
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.icj.2017.02.003
Received 23 October 2016; Accepted 11 February 2017
Peer review under responsibility of Mykolas Romeris University.
☆ This is the publication of the WISE project, commemorating the 70th anniversary WWII end, implemented with the support of 'Europe for Citizens Programme'
of the EU.
1 Prof. Dr. Fulvio Palombino currently serves as full professor of international law at the Department of law, where he teaches Public International Law and
International Trade Law. He is the author of two monographs dealing with international adjudication broadly understood, and of several contributions to journals of
international reputation, among them the Leiden Journal of International Law, the Heidelberg Journal of International Law and the Journal of International Criminal
Justice. He is one of the founding chairpersons of the ESIL (European Society of International Law) Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals.
E-mail address: fulpalombino@libero.it.
International Comparative Jurisprudence 2 (2016) 89–92
Available online 13 February 2017
2351-6674/ © 2017 Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
MARK
appropriate of the two, since it is more speciﬁcally directed toward that action (in toto jure genus per speciem derogatur)’
(Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, 2000). On the other hand, an ideal concurrence of crimes occurs when the oﬀences are in a relationship of
bilateral specialty, i.e. where each oﬀence requires proof of an additional element (the so called contextual element) which the
other(s) does not.
With the view to establishing how these principles work in practice, the recent judgment passed by a Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Karadžić (Prosecutor v. Karadžić, 2016) is of guidance. The
tribunal, which was called upon to establish whether cumulative convictions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
are permissible as a rule, answered the question in the aﬃrmative and this by relying on the principle of bilateral specialty. In the
terms of the decision, genocide requires the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, or religious group; crimes
against humanity must have been committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population; and a war crime
presupposes a close link between the acts of an accused and the armed conﬂict (para. 6011 and ﬀ.). To put it another way, each of
these crimes requires a contextual element that the other(s) does not, which means that ﬁrst i) they are always in a relationship of
bilateral specialty and second ii) a cumulative conviction is in the end always permissible.
The circumstance just described is susceptible to have a negative impact on the amount of sentence, but the use of bilateral
specialty is usually balanced by the totality principle as it has been applied since Delalić (Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 2001, para 429).
This principle makes it possible to reduce the sentence in cases of multiple convictions and thus to avoid a strict application of the
maxim tot crimina tot poenae (every crime charged demands just punishment). Still, its proper application always requires a correct
assessment of the gravity of each individual oﬀence, which, given the absence of a range of punishments in international criminal
law, is anything but simple. Most importantly, the issue of cumulation of oﬀences cannot be addressed only in terms of amount of
sentence, because it is the very purpose of sentencing which may be aﬀected.
Arguing from a human rights perspective, the scope of this article is exactly to assess whether i) the large use of bilateral
speciality in international criminal law is compatible with one of the main purposes of sentencing, viz. the rehabilitative one, or quite
the opposite ii) a more substantive approach to the problem of cumulation is desirable. To this end, the practice of human rights
treaty bodies regarding penitentiary systems will be carefully considered.
2. Cumulation of oﬀences and its impact on the purposes of sentencing
The purposes of sentencing in international criminal law is a question of great interest for scholars (D’Ascoli, 2011), also
considering that the statutes of the concerned tribunals do not deal with the matter. Bearing in mind the traditional domestic
theories of punishment, justiﬁcations for the latter mainly include: i) retribution (since the oﬀender harmed society, society is
entitled to inﬂict harm in return); ii) deterrence (the threat of punishment deters people from engaging in illegal acts); and iii)
rehabilitation (the punishment changes the oﬀender in order to make him a better citizen afterwards). Remarkably, as far as
international criminal law is concerned, one gets the clear impression that while punishment fulﬁls the ﬁrst two functions (even
though it is not clear which of the two is to be prioritized)2, the same is not true concerning the third one, i.e. the function to
rehabilitate the oﬀender. Suﬃce it to consider the judgment in Karadžić mentioned above. Its para. 6025 clearly states that
‘retribution and deterrence are the primary objective of sentencing (…) Other factors, such as rehabilitation, are relevant to be
considered in sentencing but should not play a predominant role.’
More in detail, the rehabilitative function of punishment is one of the most important, because its basic purpose is ‘the moral
improvement of the oﬀender such that crime is no longer an active option in his deliberations [concerning] future actions’ (Mertx
Hsieh, 2005, p. 9). Yet the function under consideration was not taken into account by the Nuremberg Tribunal, viz. the tribunal
which was the ﬁrst to give impetus to the emergence of international criminal law and inﬂuenced the jurisprudence of the tribunals
(including the ICTY) established over the years in its wake. Two reasons justify such a circumstance. First, the historical events
leading to the institution of this tribunal instilled the idea that the main objective to be fulﬁlled was to incapacitate all those
responsible for Nazi crimes. Second, and more importantly, human rights’ international protection was very limited at that time.
Since then, however, much water has ﬂowed under the bridge, and the dramatic development of human rights at international
law level has ended up also impacting on the function of punishment in criminal law. One may refer, ﬁrst, to Article 10, para. 3, of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), whereby the ‘penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation’, as well as to the General Comment of the
Human Rights Committee (1992) on that Article; its para. 10 states that ‘no penitentiary system should be only retributory; it should
essentially seek the reformation and social rehabilitation of the prisoner.’
Second, the same commitment to rehabilitation is to be found in the 2006 European Prison Rules (EPR) and the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) more generally. The EPR are recommendations of the Committee of Ministers to
member States of the Council of Europe regarding the minimum standards to be applied in prisons; accordingly, they are intended to
guide the Legislator as well as judicial authorities and prison staﬀ and inmates. Further, as rightly observed, there exists a sort of
virtuous circle in the relationship between the EPR and the ECtHR, in the sense that ‘[v]arious provisions of the EPR have been
inﬂuenced by judgments of the Strasbourg Court, and in turn the Court frequently refers to the Rules as evidence of support amongst
2 In this regard, Drumbl (2007, p. 65), observes as follows: ‘The ICTY has issued judgments that cite retribution and general deterrence as ‘equally important’,
judgments that cite retribution as the ‘primary objective’ and deterrence as a ‘further hope’, warning deterrence ‘should not be given undue prominence’, and
judgments that ﬂatly state ‘deterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences.’
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the Member States of the Council of Europe for a particular policy stance’ (Ovey, 2014). One example is Rule 6 of the EPR, according
to which ‘all detention shall be managed so as to facilitate the reintegration into free society of persons who have been deprived of
their liberty’. Additionally, Rule 102.1 (headed ‘Objective of the regime for sentenced prisoners’) provides that ‘the regime for
sentenced prisoners shall be designed to enable them to lead a responsible and crime-free life’. On the other hand, giving due weight,
inter alia, to these provisions, the ECtHR increasingly argues that ‘while punishment remains one of the aims of imprisonment, the
emphasis in European penal policy is now on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly towards the end of a long prison
sentence’ (Vinter et al. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, para. 115).3
The foregoing observations pose the question of whether the wide use of bilateral specialty in international criminal law, and thus
the fact that a cumulative conviction is indeed always permissible, may imperil the rehabilitative purpose of sentencing. The answer
cannot but be positive. Nevertheless, only a very low number of international criminal judges took this aspect into account.
Reference is made, in particular, to the separate and dissenting opinion appended by judges David Hunt and Mohamed Bennouna in
the ICTY decision in Delalić (Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 2001). According to this opinion, ‘[p]rejudice to the rights of the accused –
or the very real risk of such prejudice – lies in allowing cumulative convictions. [T]he number of crimes for which a person is
convicted may have some impact on the sentence ultimately to be served when national laws as to, for example, early release of
various kinds are applied. The risk may therefore be that, under the law of the State enforcing the sentence, the eligibility of a
convicted person for early release will depend not only on the sentence passed but also on the number and/or nature of convictions.
This may prejudice the convicted person notwithstanding that, under the Statute, the Rules and the various enforcement treaties, the
President has the ﬁnal say in determining whether a convicted person should be released early. By the time national laws trigger
early release proceedings, and a State request for early release reaches the President, the prejudice may already have been incurred.
Finally, cumulative convictions may also expose the convicted person to the (…) application of ‘habitual oﬀender’ laws in case of
subsequent convictions in another jurisdiction’ (para. 23).
3. In search of a more substantive approach to the problem of cumulation of oﬀences
Moving from these assumptions, a more substantive approach to the problem of cumulation of oﬀences in international criminal
law is desirable. The application of the principle of bilateral speciality leads to the practical result that cumulative convictions for war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are always possible, and this can have serious consequences for the accused. The
existence of a well-established jurisprudence in this matter does not necessarily tie the hands of international criminal tribunals with
regard to future cases. In Aleksovski, where the ICTY confronted the issue regarding the value of precedent in its case law, the
Appeals Chamber found that ‘a proper construction of the Statute, taking due account of its text and purpose, yields the conclusion
that in the interests of certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow the previous decisions, but should be free to
depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice’ (Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 2000, para. 107). Arguably, such reasons
exist in the matter of cumulation of oﬀences, a matter that should be revisited accordingly.
A potential solution to the problem of unfairness resulting from multiple convictions for the same conduct may be the following
one. As already said, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are oﬀences which always require proof of an additional
element that the other(s) does not (namely the intent to destroy a speciﬁed group in respect of genocide, the widespread or
systematic nature of the attack with respect to a crime against humanity and a close link between the acts of an accused and the
armed conﬂict with respect to a war crime). In this connection, with a view to identifying the prevailing provision, one may resort to
a criterion which, while somewhat neglected in case law, proves of much assistance: the criterion of consumption.
This criterion has been deﬁned by the ICTY in Kupreškić: ‘Its ratio is that when all the legal requirements for a lesser oﬀence are
met in the commission of a more serious one, a conviction on the more serious count fully encompasses the criminality of the
conduct’ (Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, 2000, para. 688). Such a deﬁnition, however, appears ambiguous. When one crime encompasses
all legal elements of another, there is a relationship of unilateral specialty, and the ascertainment of the relative gravity of each
crime is not necessary. This ascertainment, instead, which is required by the principle of consumption (at least as applied in civil law
systems), becomes necessary where two oﬀences are in a relationship of reciprocal specialty, and each of the two crimes
simultaneously appears both general and special in respect of the other. On the practical level, the question is always the same and
consists of establishing which parameters can be used to identify the relative gravity of each crime and, thus, the lex consumens.
The ﬁrst parameter is represented by the penalty: the oﬀence, which carries the graver penalty, consumes the other. Its
application, however, which is easy in national law systems, appears diﬃcult in international criminal law, where there is not a range
of punishments (Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2002).
The second parameter is based on the comparative gravity of the diﬀerent contextual elements of crimes. For example, there is no
doubt that, all else being equal, the contextual element of genocide is graver than the contextual element of a crime against
humanity, and makes the ﬁrst oﬀence lex consumens with regard to the latter. Support for this conclusion may be found in a number
of national and international decisions, which tacitly or expressly recognize the existence of a diﬀerence in terms of gravity between
genocide and the other international crimes. In Blaskic, the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber stressed that hierarchy of crimes had not yet
been transposed in its case law, and that the relative gravity of each crime had to be ﬁxed by reference to the circumstances of the
case (as is currently required by Article 78 of the ICC Statute) (Prosecutor v. Blaškic, 2000, para. 802). Surprisingly, in the same
judgment, the Chamber speciﬁed that the objective method for assessing the seriousness of an oﬀence ‘is linked to the intrinsic
3 See also Murray v. The Netherlands, 2016, para. 101 ﬀ.
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seriousness of the legal crime’s characterization’ (para. 803). In doing so, it implicitly used the main argument of those who are
favourable to ranking the crimes according to their gravity (Frulli, 2001). More expressly, in Kambanda, a Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) highlighted that genocide ‘is unique because of its element of dolus specialis (…);
hence (…) genocide constitutes the crime of crimes’ (Prosecutor v. Kmbanda, 1998, para. 14). In the same vein, in Eichmann, the
Israel District Court described the crime of genocide as the ‘crime of the crimes’ (Eichmann 1061). The same remarks apply as far as
the relationship between a crime against humanity and a war crime is concerned. And indeed, also in this case, the contextual
element of the former - ceteris paribus - is graver than that of the latter (Frulli, 2001).
4. Conclusion
In spite of the existence of a well-established jurisprudence on the matter, the issue of cumulation of oﬀences in international
criminal law still appears quite controversial. The approach followed by international criminal tribunals in dealing with it, namely
resort to the principle of reciprocal speciality, allows the conviction of an individual of two or more crimes with regard to the same
conduct. Such an approach, however, is questionable, since it can bring about serious and unfair consequences for the accused,
especially by jeopardising the rehabilitative purpose of sentencing. On these grounds, it is our view that also where two or more
crimes are in a relationship of reciprocal speciality, the criterion of consumption should be adopted in order to identify the prevailing
criminal provision.
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